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IN THE S.UPREME COURT
of the
STATE, OF UTAH

NELLIE A. LQVETT,
Plaint~ff and Respondent,

-vs.THE CONTINENTAL BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY, a corporation,
Executor of the Estate of Mrs. J. U.
Giesy, also known as Juliet Galena
Gie~sy,· Deceased,

Case No.

8199

Defendant and Appellarnt.

BRIEF. OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action arose out of a claim asserted by Nellie
A. Love~tt, plaintiff below, respondent herein, against
The Continental Bank and Trust Company, defendant
below, appellant herein, as Executor of the Estate of Mrs·.
J. U. Giesy, for certain jewelry claimed 'by Mrs. Lovett.
to have heen given to her by Mrs. Giesy, prior to her·
death, and for compensation for services claimed by Mrs.
Lovett to have been rendered for Mrs. Giesy.
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Mrs. Giesy was the widow of a physician who had
formerly practiced in Salt Lake City. She resided in
the Marylan'd Apartments on East South T'emple Street.
She died in 1953, ·at an age of approximately 76 years.·
Mrs. Lovett i~s the wife of Harry D. Lovett, an
accountant for 31 years at Utah Power and Light Com.
pany. He testified that his wife visited ¥rs. Giesy in
May of 1950 and from that time until the time of Mrs.
Giesy's death on March 17, 1953, performed numerous
personal services for Mrs. Giesy such as house work and
personal beauty work; that during this period his wif.e
accompanied Mrs. Giesy to The Continental Bank and
Trust Company and to h.er physician, Dr. Smith, and
that Mrs. Love·tt from time to time made out checks for
Mrs. Giesy and assisted ·her with her correspondence.
Curiously, however, Mrs. Lovett was not seeking
employment when she went to visit Mrs. Giesy that May
in 1950 (R. 56), and Mrs. Giesy had in her employ several
persons from time to time - Mrs. Alene Dougl·as, a
negress, Mrs. ·Haig and Mrs. Maddocks (R. 31, 38, 39).
On Sunday afternoons Mr. and nfrs. Lo¥ett and
Mrs. Giesy often went for automobile rides together, as
Mr. Lovett said, to make Mrs. Giesy's life as happy as
possible (R. 72). Mrs. Uiesy, compared Mr. Lovett to
her husband, Dr. Giesy, in commenting th·at Dr. Giesy
never took her to the gas station to buy gasoline (R. 72).
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Mr. and Mrs. Lovett had dinner with Mrs. Giesy.
"lots of tim·es" during their association, sometimes in
Mrs. Giesy's apartment, sometimes in restaurants while
they would be enjoying automobile rides together. Sometimes Mrs. Giesy would pay the check, sometimes Mr.
Lovett would pay the check (R. 72). None of the persons
ernployed by Mrs. Giesy were o~bserved eating with her,
however ( R. 62, 63).
· Mrs. Giesy often went with Mrs. Lovett to watch
Mr. Lovett bowl (R. 72).
In all, their association appeared to be a mutually
enjoyable one, typical of many friendly social relationships. And as would be expected, Mrs. Lovett was never
paid any money during all the ~ime she was acquainted
with Mrs. Giesy (R. 66). All employees of Mrs. Giesy
were paid regularly (R. 67).
In spite of the obvious bond of affection between
Mrs. Love~tt and Mrs. Giesy, Mr. Lovett was careful to
state that while ~Irs. Giesy liked Mrs. Lovett, Mrs.
Lovett's emotion was one of "respect" (R. 73).
About six months after the May visit at Mrs. Giesy's
apartment, Mrs. Giesy, in the company of Mrs. Lovett
purchased a large diamond ring (Ex. 1) from Daynes
Jewelry. for $2,070.00.
In October, 1952, Mrs. Giesy entered the hospital
(R. 35). She remained there for a period of six or s·even
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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weeks (R. 36), leaving in the 1niddle of Nove1nber. While
there, her jewelry was placed in a vault in the hospital
(R. 46).
Mr. Lovett testified that during the latter part of
November, 1952, while visiting Mrs. Gie'sy, Mrs. Gies'
said that she wanted Mrs. Lo.vett to have the ring and
handed it to her in an envelope (Ex. 2) which contained
a box with the ring inside of the box.

On Friday, March 13, 1953, Mrs. Giesy became
acutely ill. She continued to get worse from Friday
morning until Saturday when Mrs. M·addocks, her nurse,
called Dr. Smith (R. 79). Dr. Smith, the personal physician and friend of Mrs. Gie'sy called upon her that day
and again Sunday n1ornin·g. On Sunday morning Dr.
Smith said that Mrs. Giesy would have to go to the
hospital.
She had been very ill on the 13th, 14th and 15th; and
Dr. Smith hald wanted her to· go to the hospital earlier,
but she did not want to go (R. 117). On Sunday morning
he insisted.
He told Mrs. Giesy that he did not want her to take
her jewelry to the hospital because he had a great deal
of difficulty with her jewelry at tunes when she was in
the hospital before . He said:
"I don't want to be bothered with it. I don't
intend to be responsible; I don't intend to have
the hospital held responsible."
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lie suggested that she have Mrs. Lovett take charge of
the jewelry. Mrs. Giesy said that she would (R·. 117).
She directed Mrs. Maddocks to call Mrs. Lovett so that
she could turn the jewelry over to her.
At about one o'clock on March 15, 1953, Mrs. Giesy
was taken to the hospital. Mrs. Maddocks testified that
she was instructed to follow her with the jewels. However, Mrs. Maddocks said she ~ad a blowout in the driveway so she called Mr. and ~frs. Lovett and requested
that they take her to the hospital.
When Nir. and Mrs. Lovett arrived at Mrs. Giesy's
apartment, 1\{rs. Lovett went in the apartment and Mr.
Lovett remained in the car. When Mrs. Lovett came out
of the apartment, she was carrying a jewel bo~ (Ex. 12).
Mr. Lovett, Mrs. Lovett, and Mrs. Maddocks then went
to the L.D.S. Hospital. When they arrived at the hospital, Mrs. Lovett and Mrs. Maddocks went inside. Mr.
Lovett remained in the car to examine the jewelry (R.
49). He saw in the box certain i terns of jewelry (Ex. 3
through 11, except 6). When Mrs. Lovett and Mrs. ·Maddocks returned, Mr. Lovett drove then1 home.
That evening Mr. and Mrs. Lovett returned to the
hospital to visit Mrs. Giesy. Mr. Lovett testified that
Mrs. Giesy said that she wanted Mrs. Lovett to have the
jewelry. Mr. Lovett put the jewelry in his safety box at
Walker Bank Building.
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During the night of March 16 and the 1norning of
March 17, Mrs. Gie'sy was in a stuporous condition. That
morning Mr. and Mrs. Lovett 'vere advised by a nurse
at the hospital that Mrs. Giesy was dying and to hurry
to the hospital. Twenty minutes later Dr. Smith called
and sai'd that Mrs. Giesy had died. Mr. and Mrs. Lo:vett
went to the hospital, arriving thet'e at_ approximately
6 :'30 a.m. They met a nurse, Mrs. Garrison, in Mrs.
Gie~sy's room. Mrs. Giesy's body was in the room at the
time. She had on her ears a pair of diamond earrings
(Ex. 6). At the -request of 1\tfrs. Lovett, the earrings were
removed from Mrs. Giesy's body by ~1:rs. Garrison and
handed to Mrs. Lovett ( R. 54) .
Within four days following Mrs. Giesy's death, and
within a day or two following the funeral, Mrs. Lovett
called Mr. D. A. Skeen, Mrs. Giesy's attorney, and asked
if she could 'see him. She was told that she could and she
went to his -office. She asked about the will and it was
either read to her or she was given its substance .. Mrs.
Lovett previously knew she was a beneficiary under the
will (R. 143).
She said that she had a box containing Mrs. Giesy's
jewelry and asked what she should do with it. S-he said
that ~she had taken it because she didn't want to leave it
in the home after Mrs. Giesy's going to the hospital (R.
139). Mr. Skeen said he though.t they should call Mr.
O'Meara, Trust Officer of The Continental Bank, Executor of the Will. When Mr. O'Meara arrived, he asked
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Mrs. Lovett for the jewelry which, he had been advised,
was in her possession. She said that she would turn it
over to him. She said that she had it in a safety deposit
box for "safekeeping." She refused to turn over the large
dian1ond ring purchased from Daynes, however, s1nce,
she claimed, "it had been given to her." (R~ 131).
Mr. O'Meara, who arrived inunediately after Mrs.
Lovett had learneq the contents of the will, observed that
she was "upset, even shocked". Under the terms of the
will, Mrs. Lovett was t<? receive a collection of ceramic
geese figurines and a needlepoint rocking chair. Mr.
Lovett was to receive a piano (R. 132, Ex. 21).
Mrs. Lovett called Dr. Smith and asked him to come
to her home. He did so. Mrs. Lovett said she had all of
the jewelry. Dr. Smith replied that when Mr. O'Meara
asked for the jewelry, she should turn it over to him.
She said that she would. She did not suggest in any way
that it had been given to her (R. 119).
A day or two prior to April 3, 1953, Mr. O'Meara
discussed the jewelry 'vith Mr. Edward M. Morrissey,
attorney, who at this time had been employed by Mrs.
Lovett. He said if demand were rnade he would advise
Mrs. Lovett to return the jewelry, without waiving any
claim she might have. Demand was made on April 3,
1953 (Ex. 15). Mrs. Lovett was ad~ised to return all
jewelry ~xcept the large ring, that claim would probably
not be made for the ring (R·. 90, 91, 92). All jewelry
except the ring was later delivered to the bank.
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Sometime later, Mrs. Lovett can1e to Dr. Smith's
offi~e and said that she had turned all the jewelry over
to the estate, except the large ring. She said "they were
going to try to take the ring from her" (R~ 120), and
added that she was considering claiming all of the
jewelry. Yet even to Dr. S.mith, whom she had visited
with Mrs. Giesy for almost three years, she did not say it
had been given to her. She had been "advi·sed to claim
it." (R. 121).
On Jun'e 13, 1953, a suit was filed in which the first
cause of action sought to recover the jewelry which had
been delivered to The Continental Bank and Trust Company. The second cause of action asked for $3,300.00,
which it was alleged Mrs .. Giesy agreed to pay Mrs.
Lovett for services (R. 2). The Bank counterclaimed for
the large ring. o·n F'ebruary 16, 1954, the jury returned
a verdict for the plaintiff for the jewelry, excep·t the
earrings which had been withdrawn from their conside.ration on motion, and for $3,300.00.

On February 17, 1954, the Bank moved for a new
trial or for judgment not withstanding the verdict~ This
motion was d·enied. This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.

THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AS A MA'ITER
OF LAW TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTIFF ON PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF
ACTION.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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II. THE -EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER
OF LAW TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT IN FAVO·R OF
PLAINTIFF ON PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE OF
ACTION.
1. Tbere is no evidenc·e to support an express contract
of employment as pleaded in plaintiff's complaint.
2. The evidence of implied contract of employment is
insufficient as a matter of law to justify the verdict
in faV10r of pb1iritiff.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CHARGE TO
THE JURY.
1. Instruction No. 3 is erroneous as a matter of law
in that it places the burden of negativing · a gift
upon the defendant.
2. Instruction No. 6 is erroneous as a matter of law
in that it is a misstatement of the law as it pertains
to delivery of the subject of an aUeged gift.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER
OF LAW TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTIFF ON PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF
ACTION.

In her first cause of action plaintiff claimed that she
was the owner of and entitled to possession of the pieces
of jewelry involved in this case. Her claim of ownership
is based upon an alleged gift, claimed to have b~en made
on March 13, 1953.
Th~

law is well settled that one who asserts title by
gift has the burden of proving that a gift was Inade, inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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eluding the exi'Stence of all of the elements essential to
its validity. A clear and un1nis~akeable intention on the
part of the donor to make a gift of his property is one
of the essential requisites. Jones, et al., v. Cook (Utah,
1950) 223 P .. (2d) 423.
In the Jones Case, Leah C. Jones brought action
against Mark B. Cook as Executor of the Estate of Mark
Cook, his father, for conversion of an automobile which
Mris. Jones claimed as a residuary legatee under the last
will and testament of 1\iark Cook. The evidence in that
case showed that the defendant Mark B. Cook paid the
taxes on the automobile beginning with the year 1944.
Mark Cook ·died in July, 1943. The certificate of ownership was in the name of Mark Cook. Mark B. Cook used
the automobile p·art of the time but it was left in a
garage on the homestead of the parents most of the time.
Defendant at that time had no passenger car of his own
hut he had a truck. Up to the time of trial defendant
made no claim to the effect that he acquired title by
virtue of a parole gift from his father in May, 1943. At
the time of trial, however, h'e set up such a defense. His
wife testified that in May, 1943, Mark Cook came over
to the home of defendant and requested defendant to
take him for a ride in th·e car. The witness was invited
to go along. The father then handed the defendant the
certificate of title to the automobile an·d ·said, "Mark,
here is the certificate of ownership and the extra set of
keys to the car. I'm giving it to you with the understanding that you take mother and I at any time we want to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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go." Defendant did not tell plaintiff at any time prior
to the trial that his father had made a gift of the car to
him. His wife testified that the father told her husband
to say nothing to anyone about the matter.
This Court said :
"There is no presumption in favor of a gift
inter vivos. One who aS'serts title by gift inter
vivos has the. burden of proving that a gift was
made inciudirig the existence of all of the elements
essential to its validity. (Citing Authorities).
The rule is that 'a clear and unmistakea:ble intention on the· part of the donor to make a gift of his
property is an essential requisite of a gift inter
vivos.' (Citing Authorities)."
It was held in that case that the defendant did not
prove a parole gift by clear and convincing evidence.
The certificate of ownership was not endor~sed; there was
a serious dispute as to when defendant obtained possession of the certificate; and it was doubtful as .to whether
the alleged donor was divested of all dominion and control over the pr·operty since the father was unable to
drive the car, and it was kept on the father's. premises
except when defendant was using it; defendant did not_
claim a gift for four years, and the assertion of such
contention for the first time when the case went to trial
suggests that the idea of a gift was an after-thought.
The judgment of the lower court in favor of defendant
was reversed.
rrhe evidence before the coul't as to the alleged gift
in the instant case is likewise not clear and convincing.
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Mrs. Maddocks was -specifically directed by Mrs.
Giesy to follow the a1nbulance to the hospital with the
jewelry. Instead, she telephoned Mrs. Lovett to come
to the apartment, and when she arrived, handed to her
the. jewelry (R. 80) .

By her instructions to Mrs. Maddocks, Mrs. Giesy
expre'S'sed clearly an intention to retain do1ninion and
control over the j'ewelry.
Mrs. Giesy told DT. S1nith just before she le.ft for
the hospital that she would have Mrs. Lovett take charge
of her jewelry while ·she was in the hospital (R. 117).
No claim of gift was made while Mrs. Giesy was
living even though Mrs. Maddocks handed the jewelry to
Mrs. Lovett two days p·tior to Mrs. Giesy's death. It was
not mentioned to Dr. Smith even though M~s. Lovett had
_lmown hin1 and of his relationship of friend and physician of Mrs. Giesy for at least three years.
A few days after Mrs. Giesy's .death, at the home of
Mrs. Lovett, Dr. Smith was told by Mrs. Lovett that
she would turn over all jewelry except the large ring to
Mr. O'M~eara. She made no claim of gift (R. 119). This
conversation, oddly, was at the instance of Mrs. Lovett.
She wanted to know what to do with the jewelry.
P·eculiar, to say the least, if she thought Mrs. Giesy had
given it to her. Why differentiate betwe.en the large ring
and the other jewelry1 The answer is obvious. She was
"-advised" to make claim of gift of the other jewelry (R.
121).
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Mrs. Lovett told Mr. Skeen and Mr. O'Meara that
she had the jewelry for "safekeeping" (R. 131). She said
she would withhold the large ring, "because it ~ad been
given to her" (R. 131, emphasis added), but the. other
jewelry would be delivered to Mr. O'Meara.
Counsel attempted to show by the testimony of Mr.
Morrissey, Mrs. Lovett's attorney rat that time, that when
the jewelry was delivered to the Bank, 1frs. Lovett was
not admitting anything. It is indeed significant that the
conversation between Mr. Morrissey and Mr. O'Meara
was about two weeks after the conve-rsations between
Mrs. Lovett and Dr. Smith, and Mrs. Lovett and Mr.·
Skeen and Mr. O'Meara at Mr. Skeen's office . Mr. Morrissey did not advise Mrs. Lovett to return the jewelry
until after April 3, 1953, two weeks after she had al~eady
agreed to do so. (R. 110, 119, 131).
Although numerous opportunities were presented,
Mrs. Lovett never claimed that a gift of the jewelry to
her had been made prior to the filing of her complaint.
This conduct, viewed in the light of human experience,
shows most persuasively that the claim of gift was a
complete after-thought, made upon advice of counsel. If
this were not a fact, Mrs. Lovett would have taken the
stand in rebuttal, as permitted by the Dead Man's
Statute, and denied it.
The verdict in this case upon Respondent's first
cause of action lacks the· support of clear and convincing
evidence and should accordingly be reversed.
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II. THE EVIDENCE IS IN.SUFFICIENT AS A MATTER
OF LAW TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTIFF ON PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE OF
ACTION.
1. '.Uhere is no evidence to support an express contract
of employment as pleaded in plaintiff's complaint. ·

Paragraph 4 of plaintiff's second cause of action
alleges "that between the first day of June, 1950, and the
16th day of March, 1953, plaintiff rendered s·ervices to
said deceased at said decea:sed's express instance and
request of the reasonable value of Thirty-three Hundred
Dollars ($3,300.00); that said deceased agreed to pay
plaintiff the sum of Thirty-three Hundred Dollars
($3,300.00) for said services."
Rule 8 (e)(2), U.R.C.P., provides "a party may set
forth two or more statements of a claim or defense
alternatively or hypothetically, either in one count or
defense or in separate counts or defenses."
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the second cause of action of plaintiff's complaint upon the ground that the evidence failed
as a matter of law to show an exp·ress agreement between
plaintiff and Mrs. Giesy for payment of the sum of
Thirty-three Hundred Dollars ($3,300.00) for services
alleged to have been performed by plaintiff. Plaintiff
contended that he·r pleading carne within the rule permitting alternative statements of a claim in the same
'count and that the motion therefore should be denied.
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The same objection was raised by defendant in its
requested instructions for the jury wherein defendant
sought to have the issue of implied contract taken fro1n
the jury.
Rule 8 (e) (2) permits alternative statements o£ a
claim but does not permit inconsistent staternents of a
claim not pleaded alternatively. A fair reading of paragraph 4 of plaintiff's second cause of action states a
claim upon expres~s contract, the two sentences in that
count being conjunctive rather than disjunctive. This
being so, the issue of implied contract should not have
been ·submitted to the jury and· defendant's motion to
dismiss the second cause of action should have been
granted at the close of plaintiff's evidence.
In Morris v. Russell, (Utah, 1951) 236 P. (2d) 451,
the plaintiff pleaded on one count an express contract
for $100.00 per month and on another count for quantum
meruit for the reasonable value of his services. At the
conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, the court granted
a motion to strike the count in quantum meruit. After
the presentation of the defendant's evidence, however, the
court vacated its former ruling and reinstated the count.
The S.upreme Court on appeal said that the adding of
the quantum meruit count was equivalent to conforming to the proof and that, since there was no showing
that the defendants we-re mi'sled nor prevented from
presenting their evidence or in any way prejudiced by
reinstating the count, the trial court did not err in perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
n1itting the case to go to the jury on the theory of implied
contract.
Where, however, the defendant does not have adequate notice of his opponent's claim and is surprised,
misled, or prejudiced in his defense, and has no opportunity to meet the i'ssues presented, it is error to subnut
a case to the jury on a theory of implied contract when
the cause of action was pleaded in express contract. See
TO!JJl·or v. E. M. Royle Corp. (Utah, 1953), 264 P. (2d)
279.
Defendant in this case was p·repared to meet a claiin
based upon an express contract. Defendant's investigation disclosed, and the trial confirmed, that there w;;:ts in
fact no such contract. Defendant was relatively assured
that any proof of express contract would have to co1ne
from the plaintiff herself and, since defendant was of
the opinion that the testimony of plaintiff would not be
proper in this case, defendant considered it nece·ssary to
be very cautious so as to avoid a waiver of the incoinpetency of the .plaintiff as provided for by the Dead
Man's Statute.
If defendant had reasonably been apprised of the
nature of the claim which would he made by plaintiff
upon the trial of this case, defendant would have enlployed pretrial discovery procedures to determine precisely what 'services plaintiff clain1ed were pe~formed
and in all respects, defendant could have prepared itself
to meet such proof.
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Defendant, under the peculiar facts of this case, had
no opportunity to determine the precise nature of plaintiff's claim by way of interrogatory or deposition of the
plaintiff, since to employ either of those procedures
might well have resulted in a waiver of the incompetency
of the plaintiff.
It is clearly apparent that this case comes within the
rule of Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., supra, since defendant was not, prior to the submission of plaintiff's evidence in this case, ever called upon to meet a claim based
upon quantum meruit.
We earnestly submit that defendant was misled by
plaintiff's pleading, surprised by the proof, and prejudiced in the preparation of its defense.
2. The evidence of implied contract of employment is
insufficient as a matter of law to justify the v;erdict
in favor of plaintiff.

It is well settled that if, from all the circumstances
surrounding the parties and under which the service~s
were commenced and rendered, it can be reasonably
inferred that the one expected to receive remuneration
and the other intended to pay for the services, a promise
to pay therefore may be implied. See Mathias v. Tingey,
39 Utah 561, 118 P. 781 (1911).
Correspondingly, if the circmnstances repel the
inference that compensation was intended, no obligation
to pay will .be implied. Thus it has generally been held
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that.when one performs work for. another, relying solely
upon his generosity in expectation of being rewarded by
a gift or hy a legacy, wages are not demandable in an
action -at law for the value thereof if the party 'benefited
dies without making such p-rovision. "Circumstances
other than relationship of parties which repel inference
of an agreement to pay for work performed at one's
request or with his acquiescence." 54 A.L.R., 548, citing
Jacob v. Ursuline Nuns, 2 Mart. (La.) 269, 5 Am. Dec.
730 (1812); GraffiAdin v. Reading, 10 N.J. Eq. 370 (1855)
O'biter; Davison ·v. ·Davison, 13 N.J. Eq. 264 (1861)
Obiter; ShakespeMe v. Ma.rkham, 10 Hun~ (N.Y.) 311
(1877), affirmed in 72 N.Y. 300 (1878); Mille,r v. Lash
(1881) 85 N.C. 51; Little v. Dawson, 4 Dall. (Pa.) 111, 1
L. Ed. 763 (1791); Messi.er v. Messier, 34 R.I. 233, 82
Atl. 9-66 (1912) Obiter.
The issue 'before the court on this· appeal with
respect to the p~rticular point now under consideration
is, therefore: Whether the services were rendered under
such circumstances a!s. the parties would reasonably contemplate that comp·ensation was intended, or whether the
services rendered would reasonably be interpreted as a
gratuity in expectation of a legacy.
This would normally he a question of fact, but when
the evidence, .as here,· fails to sh.ow circumstance's from
which a promise to pay can r·easonably he inferred,. respondent has failed to sustain her burden of proof.
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An exa1nination of the record shows :
Juliet Galena Giesy was 76 years of age at the time
of her death. She had no close relatives, her husband
having predeceased her (R. 25, 26) ;
Harry D. Lovett, husband of respondent, was employed as an accountant for Utah Power & Light Company and had been so employed for 31 years (R. 24);
Respondent began perforn1ing some personal services for Mrs. Giesy on or about June 1, 1950. She was
not seeking employment (R. 56);
Reispondent never was paid "in money" for any of
the services she clailned to have performed, even though
she claims to have performed services extending over a
period of just less than three years. Every other person
who performed a service of any kind for Mrs. Giesy was
paid regularly (R. 66, 67, 68);
As appears from the entire record, and in spite of
the efforts of Mr. Lovett to conceal this fact, the relationship of Mrs. Giesy and respondent was clearly something other than master and servant ;
Mrs. Lovett was designated as "friend" on the
admission records of the L.D.S. Hospital (R. 101);
Respondent told Mrs. Winder, a friend of Mrs.
Gi~sy, that she was taking care of Mrs. Giesy as a friend
and that she was doing it because she loved her (R. 129);
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When respondent becarne a\\7are of the provisions of
Mrs. Giesy's will, she was "upset and shocked" (R. 131);
No claim was ever 1nade for compensation for any
services until after ·the death of Mrs. Giesy, indeed, not
until the filing of this action ;
Mr. Lovett, respondent and Mrs. Giesy spent considerable time together in a social relationship;
No conrment was ever made with reference to pay
for respondent, except the con1m·ent that respondent
would be well paid.
It, therefore; appears clear from even a casual
examination of this record that any services that might
have been performed by respondent were· intended to be
gratuitous, in expectation of a legacy. There is no substantial evidence giving rise to the inference that either
respondent or Mrs. Giesy intended the services to be upon
a reasonable charge basis.
While a case of implied promise need not be n1ade
O·Ut by overwhelming evidence, it is certainly true that
a bill for .services alleged to have been re~dered to an old
person for a considerable ti1ne before death without
collecting on account, or without anything in writing to
show the agreement, or without showing that any demand
had ever been made on the one cared for and what the
outcome of that demand was, should be carefully
scrutinized before allowance by the executor, and should
be carefully scrutinized by this court.
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The picture which this record presents is one of a
person rendering some services to an elderly lady of
means as a friend, intended to be gratuitous from their
inception, and understood by the recipient to be gratuitous until her death. It is undoubtedly true that respondent expected a legacy and that she thought she was the
recipient of a substantial legacy until the will was read.
If she had thought herself to be an employee, she would
certainly have made demand for payment at some time.
A person in the peculiar position of Mrs. Lovett, however, might not be exp.ected to n1ake a demand since that
might antagonize Mrs. Giesy and result in no legacy
being provided. Respondent well knew this. hazard.
Everything respondent did points directly to a hope that
substantial provision would be made for her in Mrs.
Giesy's will.
Here respondent having pleaded but totally failed
in her proof on express contract, asserted that Mrs. Giesy
should reasonably have understood that respondent expected money for her apparent acts of kindness, that
Mrs. Giesy should have known that Mrs. Lovett was
motivated, not by friendship, but by expectation of gain.
Respondent claims she was to be well paid. She
claims that jewelry having by her evidence a retail value
of $7,000.00 and a large diamond ring costing $2,070.00
were given to her, but, apparently, that is not being well
paid. She contends that Mrs. Giesy should have understood that her "witto Nell" (Ex. 2) was working for
wages.
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The law has a substantial intel"est in protecting
testamentary disposition of property. The law should
and does, carefully scrutinize the activities of one who
performs personal services . in an obvious attempt to
ingratiate herself ·with an elderly lady of substantial
means in the expectation of receiving a considerable
legacy upon the death of the one befriended, and who
when disappointed by the provision made, claims that all
services were performed in reasonable expectation of
payment by both parties to the relationship. This conduct is all too common, and should not be sanctioned by
this court.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CHARGE TO
THE JURY.
1. Instruction No. 3 is erroneous as a matter of law
in that it places the burden of negativing a gift
upon the defendant.

Instruction No. 3 was :
"The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove by
a preponde:rance of the evidence, as that term is
hereinafter defined, the allegations of the 2nd
cause of action of said complaint, as the same are
set forth in Instruction No. 1; and the burden is
upon the defendant to so prove the allegations of
its counter-~laim, as the same are set forth in
Instruction No. 2."
This instruction placed the burden upon the defendant to neg·ative the ele1nents of a· gift so far as the large
diamond ring 'vas concerned, \Vhich is contrary to the
rule of the recent case of Jones et al v. Cook (Utah, 1950)
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223 P. 2d 423, and the case of Blackburn et al., v. Jones,
59 Utah 558, 205 P. 582 (1922).
The latter case was an action brought by an executor to quiet title to certain real property. The defendant
claimed title through gift. A decree was entered quieting
title in the defendant from which judgment the plaintiff
appealed. The Court said that a court of equity will
scrutinize with jealous care any claim such as was made
by defendant and the burden will be upon him to satisfactorily explain that the conveyance was made either as
a gift or for a valuable consideration. The judgment was
reversed.
In Jones et al·, v. Cook, supra, th·e burden was upon
the defendant, who claimed title by gift, to prove· his
title by clear and convincing evidence.
In the instant case, the respondent, as a part of her
case in chief, set out to prove that a gift had hee:r:t made
to her of the large ring by Mrs. Giesy. Since the title
she claimed was derived by gift, she, not the executor,
had the burden of proof upon this issue.
Instruction No. 3 placed an impossible burden upon
appellant. Appellant was required to prove that a gift
of the large ring had not been made, and, as counsel for
the Army in the recent McCarthy hearings, . Joseph
Welch, recently said: "Any lawyer knows you cannot
prove a negative."
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Error up·on something as fundantental as the burden
of proof, which is confused, not corrected, by the charge
to the jury considered as a whole, properly requires a
new trial. Particularly is this true where, as here, substantial p:rejudice results.
2. Instruction No. 6 is erroneous as a matter of law
in that it. is a misstatement of the law as it p.ertains
to delivery of the subject of an alleged gift.
Instruction No. 6 provides :
"To constitute a gift inter vivos of personal
property there must be a delivery of the· subject
of the gift by the owner to the. donee, or to a third
pe~son for the benefit of the donee, with the
intention to transfer title of the p·roperty to the
donee. When property is so delivered with such
intent, it becomes the property of the donee and
the owner has no further interest therein.
"If you believe and find from the evidence
that Mrs. Giesy delivered the jewelry in question
to plaintiff, or authorized or directed Mrs. Maddocks to deliver the jewelry to plaintiff, with the
intent that the jewelry was to go to and belong to
plaintiff as her own property, then you are instructed that a valid gift of the jewelry was made
to plaintiff and on. this issue your verdict must
he in favor of plaintiff and against defendant on
plaintiff's first cause of action."
It is fundamental that delivery to a third person,
unless that p·erson receives as trustee for the donee, is
not a sufficient delivery to complete a gift. This question
is to be determined from· the intention of the donor, the
situation and relationship of the parties, the kind and
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character of the pToperty, and the things said and done
in regard thereto. If the property remains under the
control of the donor although in the keeping of a third
person and the third peTson is. subject to the further
direction of the donor as to its final disposition then the
third person's relationship is that of agent.· See Reed
et al. v. Knudson, et al., 80 Utah 428, 16 P. (2d) 347
(1932).
In this case any delivery to Mrs. Maddocks would
have been as agent for the donor and, since under the
instruction the jury could have found that delivery to
Mrs. Maddocks was a sufficient delivery to constitute a
completed gift, the instruction was erroneous and
prejudicial.
This is true even though there was sorne: evidence
produced by the respondent to the effect that the jewelry
was thereafter. handed to respondent since the jury was
not required to believe, and there was no evidence to
show, that delivery to -respondent was ever intended by
Mrs. Giesy to be completed, whether immediately or at
all. In this connection it is significant that respondent's
evidence showed that Mrs. Maddocks was to take the
jewelry to the hospital and were it not for the fact that
she blew out a tire the jewelry would have been taken
to the hosp·ital where presumably Mrs. Giesy would have
retained some control over it. The evidence in this regard
was not clear and convincing and was made even less so
by the erroneous instruction with reference to one of the
vital elements of a gift.
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CONCLUSION
C·ases are all too comn1on in which friends of a
deceased take charge of personal belongings so that they
will not be left in a vacant apartment and then later
claim that a gift of the belongings had been 1nade. Such
a claim can in Inost cases be asserted without fear of
contradiction, since the lips of the other party to the
transaction have been sealed by death.
It is significant in this case to observe the gradual
change of position asserted by Mrs.-Lovett from the time
of Mrs. Giesy's death until the time of the filing of this
action. She first readily admitted that she was holding
the jewelry for safekeeping and much later as ·an afterthought, and when advised to do· so by counsel, she
asserted absolute ownership, but, even then, only through
her counsel. She herself never at any time claimed that
a gift had been made to her. She never at any time contradicted the te,stimony of Dr. Smith, with whom she
was friendly, nor that of Mr. Skeen, or Mr. O'Meara,
even though she was competent under the Dead Man's
Statute to testify as to these n1atters in rebuttal had
she so desired.
Claims of gifts asserted after the death .of the
alleged donor must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. The law of wills has been developed ove.r
centuries and formal requirements have been laid down
by courts and by legislatures to insure that a person
who makes testamentary disposition of his property can
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die with the conviction that hi~s wishes, as solemnly
expressed, will be carried out by his executor.
Mrs. Giesy's intention as shown by 'her will (Ex. 21)
was that Anona Guthrie, her cousin's wife receive her
jewelry. Appellant was charged with the responsibility
of executing Mrs. Giesy's will and giving expression to
her intention. Such intention should not he, frustrated
upon evidence which is uncertain and unconvincing.
Also far too common are claims for compensation
proceeding from disappointment in the terms of a will.
Such claims are as old as reported decisions, for examp1·e,
Little v. Daffin, supra, decided in 1791. Such claims
must be scrutin.ized carefully by reviewing courts, and
where, as here, are contradicted by all of the objective
evidence in the case, must he rejected.
Appellant respectfully urges that the evidence in
this case lacks the quality of clear and convincing evidence and, therefore, fails to support the verdict; that
the instructions given on delivery and on the burden of
proof were manifestly erroneous; that these errors resulted in substantial prejudice to appellant in the trial
of this case; and that the judgment, accordingly, should
be reversed and a new trial ordered.
Resp·ectfully submitted,

SKEEN, THUR.MAN, WORSLEY
& SNOW,

Attorneys for Appellant.
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